This paper aims to analyze the Czech experience of countering disinformation on both governmental and non-governmental levels. The reason for choosing the Czech Republic is twofold: firstly, the historical commonalities as well as current similarities in terms of the praxis of the disinformation in the Czech case make it worth examining for Georgia; and secondly, with comparison to other European countries, the Czech Republic led with a major policy shift on the topic on Russian disinformation and thus provides some useful lessons. Číst dále
Analysis of the texts of annual intelligence reports has proven what the European Values Center for Security Policy has been claiming for years. The hostile influence operations are not a random occurrence, nor are they a phenomenon that concerns a few countries only. In fact, our research has uncovered a broad consensus among the intelligence agencies in terms of existing tactics and tools applied by Russia and China. In other words, our long-held stance has now been backed by “hard data” i.e. texts of intelligence agencies. Report available in PDF. Číst dále
Security Strategies Program is publishing the second part of its publication “How do EU Members States’, Canadian and the United States Intelligence Agencies Assess Russian and Chinese Influence Operations?”. This second report examines Russian and Chinese influence in the Central European region. The aim of the re-port is to more closely cover the actual events that have already happened in Central Europe and analyze them as part of the larger picture. The report is divided into two parts: Russia and China. In both cases, the report will first go through the short- and long-term goals for the countries. These goals have been adjusted to the context of Central Europe: what is the value of Central Europe for Russia and China? How does the region work as a mean towards larger foreign policy goals, and how does the region work as an end itself? Read more in the report. Číst dále
With a population of a little more than 650,000 citizens, Montenegro is NATO’s newest and smallest member. It joined the Alliance controversially and without a majority of public support in June 2017 (“The World Factbook: Montenegro”). Though Montenegro is small, its admission into NATO is viewed as a big win for the Alliance. The NATO win, however, is not in terms of what Montenegro can provide militarily – it has an army of a mere 2,000 soldiers – but in terms of the message it sends to Russia and other Western Balkan nations.
However, despite NATO membership, Russian influence in the country remains significant and has shown no signs of going away. This influence is seen in nearly all levels of Montenegrin society, but most prominently in the economic, political, civil society, media, and religious realms. Russia relies heavily on disinformation and uses its proxy agents to promote its agenda directly and indirectly in the country. The high level of corruption in Montenegro and its weak institutions provides the fuel that allows Russian influence to take hold and infiltrate all levels of society without any recourse. This poses a major threat not only to Montenegro, but to the broader Western Balkan region and to both NATO and the EU. It also damages Montenegro’s chances of EU accession in 2025, which the majority of the population supports, and feels is necessary for Montenegro’s economic prosperity.
Read the full Kremlin Watch Report.
2019 marks five years of highly aggressive behavior by the Russian Federation towards Western democracies. When Russia started a war against Georgia and subsequently occupied a fifth of its territory in 2008, the West failed to respond, naively believing that it could appease an aggressor. In 2014, the authoritarian regime led by President Vladimir Putin started the war against Ukraine, and at the same time, Moscow began to mobilize intensive hostile influence operations against Western democracies.
Kremlin Watch Strategy offers a response with 20 specific measures for national governments which European countries must implement. This response is co-signed by 29 experts on security policy from all over Europe.
This text highlights the deterrent and reassuring measures as decided at last three NATO summits, including the Enhanced Forward Presence and the need of their reinforcement.
The initial premise is that deterrence is not a “pointless provocation with a potential for escalation.” In its core, it is a “peaceful” concept. We do not need deterrence so we could fight; we need it so we would not have to.
When Russia started military operations in eastern Ukraine and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, both sides of the Atlantic reacted by force posture changes and economic sanctions. Where the USA changed also its strategic doctrine, Europe has not. A wide range of policy recommendations by the US strategic thinkers demonstrates the fact that the United States took the events in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and the meddling into the US elections as a genuine game changer. It should be a common endeavor of all countries on NATO´s Eastern Flank that the build-up of US troops in the region is eventually NATO-ized.
Reader the full report in PDF.
Our Security Strategies Program presents a new report, detailing how EU, Canadian and US intelligence agencies assess Russian and Chinese influence activities. The paper first sorts the countries into three groups: The Hesitants, The Acknowledgers and The Most Alarmed, continuing onto a cross-group analysis and finally looking at the case of China in more detail. Available in PDF. Číst dále
European Values Think-Tank presents a new report from its Security Strategies Program, authored by Martin Svárovský. Číst dále
European Values Think-Tank presents a new report by the Security Strategies Program Head, Martin Svárovský. The text is reflecting the need for deterrent and reassuring measures in the form of the European Reassurance Initiative / European Deterrence Initiative along with the Enhanced Forward Presence and their further reinforcement, especially in the Baltics. PDF available here.